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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
RAYCHELLE MERRIAM,

:
Docket No.

890484-CA

Plaintiff and Appellant, :
vs.

:

TODD MERRIAM,

:

No. 7

Defendant and Respondent.:
BRIEF OF THE RESPONDENT
INTRODUCTION
The Appellant is the Plaintiff mother in this appeal and
the Respondent

is the defendant

father-

The parties will be

referred to as plaintiff or defendant throughout this brief.
The divorce trial was heard by

the Honorable Don V.

Tibbs, District Court Judge, Sixth Judicial District In and For
Sanpete County, on the 2nd day of August, 1989.

The trial Court

awarded custody of the parties' only child, a son, age 3, to the
Defendant, and the plaintiff appealed the trial court's judgment,
JURISDICTION
Plaintiff filed her appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals
pursuant to Section 78-2a-3 (2) (h) , Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as
amended, 1989, and Rule 3(a), Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals.
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Plaintiff filed a complaint for divorce on or about the
28th day of June, 1988, case number 9444.

Defendant was not aware

of plaintiff's filing and filed a complaint for divorce on July 14,
1988, case number

9448.

At a hearing

for

temporary

custody,

visitation and support, the parties stipulated that the defendant's
complaint

would

be

treated

as

a counterclaim

to

plaintiff's

complaint.
The primary issue at trial involved the custody of the
minor child of the parties, Drew Merriam, who was age 3, at the
time of trial.
A secondary issue involved the defendant's right to seek
visitation with Carson Draper, plaintiff's son by another marriage,
who resided with the parties throughout their marriage and whose
natural father resided in Winnemucca, Nevada.
The trial court awarded custody of Drew Merriam, the
parties natural child to the defendant and granted the plaintiff
visitation privileges.

The trial court also granted defendant

visitation privileges with Carson Draper, subject to the preferential visitation rights of the Carson's natural father.
Plaintiff's
Defendant's

visitation

visitation with her son Drew Merriam
with

his step-son,

Carson Draper,

and
were

arranged so the two children would be together as much as possible.
Plaintiff has appealed from that Decree of Divorce.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL
1.
Awarding

The Trial Court

Permanent

Custody

Of

Did Not Abuse Its Discretion
The

Parties' Minor

Son

To

In
The

Defendant Father.
2.

The

Trial

Court's

Consideration

Of

Information

Contained In The Custody Evaluation Report Was Not Error Because
Plaintiff Introduced Evidence Of The Evaluation Report.
2

3.

The Trial Court Did Not Error In Awarding Custody Of

The Parties Minor Child To The Defendant Father.
4.

The Trial Court Did Not Error In Splitting Custody

Of Carson Draper And Drew Merriam.
STATUTES AND RULES
Sec. 78-2a-3(2)(h), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended 1989
Rule 3(a), Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals
Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is an action for divorce.
trial

involved

Merriam.

the

custody

of

the

The primary dispute at

parties

minor

child,

Drew

A secondary issues involved the question of defendant's

right to obtain custody of or visitation with a step-son whose
natural father was still living and who had not relinquished his
rights as natural father.
Each of the parties sought custody of the minor child
Drew Merriam who was the only child born to the parties.

Defendant

also sought custody, as against the plaintiff, of the minor child
Carson Draper on the theory that defendant stood in loco parentis
with Carson.
Carson.

In the alternative, defendant sought visitation with

Defendant acknowledged

the superior rights of Mr. Kim

Draper as to custody and visitation with Carson Draper because Mr.
Draper was not*before the court in this case and Mr. Draper had not

3

relinquished his right to custody or visitation with his son nor
had his parental rights been terminated by any court.
Course of the Proceeding
A hearing for temporary custody, support and visitation
was held on August

10, 1988.

Pursuant

parties,

stipulated

plaintiff

defendant

to stipulation of
be

granted

the

temporary

custody of Drew Merriam, provided defendant was granted visitation
every weekend pending trial.
In November, 1988, plaintiff's first attorney withdrew
and present counsel assumed plaintiff's case.

Shortly thereafter,

plaintiff's counsel requested that a pretrial custody evaluation
be made by Utah State Department Of Social Services.
tion

was

Plaintiff

initially

assigned

to

a

Mr.

Kreg

The evalua-

Perry.

challenged Mr. Perry's qualifications

However,

to conduct the

evaluation and Mr. John N. Bagley, MSW, was assigned in January,
1989, to do the evaluation and prepare the report in this case.
The report was not submitted to the court and to counsel until June
12, 1989.

The case was tried to the court on August 2, 1989.

Disposition
The trial court awarded custody of Drew Merriam to the
defendant father and the plaintiff was granted visitation.

No

custody determination was made by the trial court in this case as
to Carson Draper. Plaintiff has custody of Carson Draper by a prior
Decree.

However, the trial court did grant defendant visitation

privileges subject to the prior rights of the Carson's natural
father

to preferentially

exercise
4

his visitation

rights.

The

visitation
during

scheme was arranged

visitation

regardless

so both children were
of

whether

it

was

together

plaintiff's

visitation with Drew Merriam or defendant's visitation with Carson
Draper.
After the trial, plaintiff orally requested the court to
stay execution of the judgment pending the appeal of the decision
to the Utah Court of Appeals.
of the motion.

Plaintiff did not state the basis

The trial court denied the motion.

The Decree of Divorce was entered on August 14, 1989.
Plaintiff filed her Notice Of Appeal on August 11, 1989. On August
18, 1989, plaintiff filed a Motion To Stay Judgment with the Utah
Court of Appeals.

Oral argument was heard on September 13, 1989.

The Court of Appeals awaited the filing of the transcript of trial
before issuing a decision on plaintiff's Motion To Stay Judgment.
Plaintiff's Motion was denied on October 16, 1989.
Relevant Facts
The facts recited in this section are referenced to the
Trial Transcript and to the Record On Appeal.
The parties were married to each other on November 22,
1985. (RA 2) Plaintiff had a child, Carson Draper, by a previous
marriage, and the child lived with the parties during the marriage.
(RA 103).
The parties had one child, Drew Merriam born to them of
this marriage. (RA 2) At the time of the divorce, Carson Draper was
5 years old and Drew Merriam was 3 years old.
age, he viewed defendant as his father.
5

Because of Carson's

Carson's natural father,

Kim Draper, lived in and was employed in Winnemucca, Nevada. (T.T.
41,

Ins. 7-10)

Mr. Draper

sent monthly

support

payments

to

plaintiff but visited the child infrequently. (RA 80 para. 6, 13.)
However, Mr. Draper had not relinquished his paternal rights to
the child and Mr. Draper was not a party to this action nor was he
a witness at the trial or present in the courtroom during

the

trial.
Defendant testified that during the marriage, plaintiff
revealed to defendant that she, plaintiff, had engaged in sexual
intercourse with other men during the marriage and revealed the
names of at least two of the men she had sexual relations with.
(T.T. 59, Ins. 3-24)

Defendant

also testified

that

plaintiff

further boasted to defendant about her pre-marital sexual experiences which,

combined

with

plaintiff's

extra-marital

sexual

ac-

tivities, led to the eventual demise of the marital relationship
between the parties.
Ins.

1- 18.).

(T.T. 58, In 5-25, p.59, Ins. 1-25, p. 60,

Plaintiff

denies

she had

extra-marital

sexual

relations.
At trial, plaintiff testified that she provided most of
the primary

care

of

the

children.

(T.T.17,

Ins.

3-6)

She

testified that a typical day for the minor children began at 5:00
A.M., with placement at the baby-sitters before 6:00 A.M. (T.T. 10,
Ins.

19-20, p. 20, Ins. 6-10)

She

testified

that she

between $300.00 and $500.00 per month (T.T. 26, Ins. 7,8).

6

earned

Plaintiff testified about the custody evaluation process
(T.T. 34, Ins. 13-25) and also testified as to the contents of the
report. (T.T. 35, Ins. 18-25, p. 36, Ins. 1-11).
Plaintiff
parties residence.
was

M

lived

with her parents

after she left the

She states she left the defendant because she

sick of him." (T.T. 42, Ins. 19-25).

Her father testified

that plaintiff and the two minor children lived with him and his
wife for all but the last four (4) weeks prior to trial. (T.T. 53)
Plaintiff admitted that under the circumstances that existed at the
time of the trial, the two minor children had no male role models.
Plaintiff's
nights.

father

slept

during

the day

because he worked

at

(T.T. 43, Ins. 1-4).
Defendant testified that Carson Draper viewed him in all

respects as a natural father and Carson referred to his natural
father as "his buddy." (T.T. 56, Ins. 9-15)

Defendant testified

that he provided much of the primary care for Carson and Drew and
his parents and his entire family participated in the rearing of
the two boys.

(T.T. 62, Ins. 1-17)

He also testified that during

the latter stage of their marriage he performed most of the primary
care because plaintiff was out to Richfield or elsewhere every
night. (T.T. 68, Ins. 18-25, p.69, Ins. 1-8).
Defendant

and defendant's

mother

testified

that

they

viewed Carson Draper as their natural child and grandchild (T.T.
56, Ins. 7-11) and Carson referred to defendant as "Dad." (T.T.56,
In 11)

7

Defendant testified that he agreed plaintiff could have
temporary custody pending trial because she agreed defendant could
have visitation with Carson Draper and Drew Merriam during
pretrial period.

Defendant testified that plaintiff

the

refused to

abide by her oral stipulation that defendant would be permitted to
visit with Carson while the parties awaited the completion of the
evaluation report and the scheduling of the trial. (T.T. 62, Ins.
18-25, p. 63, Ins. 1-16)
Defendant testified that plaintiff's father exposed the
minor

children

to pornographic

movies and Carson

awareness of the portrayal of sexual activity.

indicated

an

(T.T. 64, Ins. 16-

25, p. 65, Ins. 1-13) .
Defendant recommended the visitation schedule that would
permit the boys the optimum opportunities to be together (T.T 66,
In. 25, p. 67, Ins. 1-5.)

He testified that when both he and

plaintiff were at work, he intended to place the children with a
Day

Care

children
children.

facility
and his

which
mother

provides
would

pre-school

also

training

be available

for

the

tend

the

testified

she

to

(T.T. 68, Ins. 3-12, p. 75, Ins. 14-22.)
Mrs.

Joy

Merriam,

defendant's

mother,

resides with her husband in Manti, Utah, where the parties resided
during

their marriage.

She testified that she views and treats

Carson Draper as her natural grandson in all respects
Ins., 17-25, p. 85, Ins. 1-13.)

(T.T. 84

She testified that she and her

husband would be willing and able to assist in the care and rearing

8

of the two minor children even to the extent of providing medical,
educational or religious assistance.

(T.T. 86, Ins. 1-7)

Defendant's mother, Joy Merriam, testified that defendant
rendered primary care all during the marriage and that defendant
was a very good and patient father. (T.T. 87, Ins. 19 24)

Heidi

Johnson, a friend, also testified that defendant was a very patient
and good father. (T.T. 95 Ins. 8-25, p. 96, Ins. 1-2.)
Mr. Russell Meacham was called by defendant to testify
as to his relationship with the plaintiff. Mr. Meacham was asked
if he had sexual intercourse with the plaintiff and Mr. Meacham
refused to testify, invoking his privilege against self incrimination. (T.T. 81, Ins. 18-20).
The trial court granted defendant custody of the minor
child Drew Merriam and granted visitation for plaintiff. The trial
court further granted defendant visitation with Carson Draper, on
the basis

that defendant

stood

in loco parentis

with Carson.

However, defendant's right of visitation with Carson is subject to
the preferential right of the natural father to visit with Carson.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The Trial Court Is Vested With Broad Discretionary

Powers And Its Findings Should Not be Disturbed Unless They Are
Shown To Be Clearly Erroneous.

The Custody Award Was Not Based on

Plaintiff's Moral Conduct Alone.
2.

The Trial Court Did Not Error In Considering The

Pretrial Custody Report Since Plaintiff Elected To Introduce That
Evidence.
9

3.

The Trial Court Has Broad Discretionary Powers. It

Is Free To Select The Evidence Which It Believes Is More Credible.
4.

The Trial Court Has The Discretionary Authority To

Split Custody Of Minor Siblings If The Court Deems It In The Best
Interest Of The Children To Do So.
DETAILS OF ARGUMENT
I.

A.

THE TRIAL COURT IS VESTED WITH BROAD
DISCRETIONARY POWERS AND ITS FINDINGS
SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED UNLESS THE FINDINGS ARE SHOWN TO BE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.
THE TRIAL COURT BASED ITS CUSTODY AWARD ON MORE THAN

PLAINTIFF'S SEXUAL ACTIVITIES AND RELATIONSHIPS.
Although plaintiff correctly states that a custody award
should be based on more than the demonstrated morals of the parties, plaintiff does not explain how the trial court in this case
erred in failing to consider other factors.
In arriving
found

that

at its custody decision,

the defendant

treated

both Carson

the trial court
Draper

and

Drew

Merriam as his own sons and also found that the environment available to the minor child, Drew Merriam, through defendants family,
friends and relatives more favorable than that available through
plaintiff.

The court

further

found

that defendants

earning

capacity and employment was greater and more sound than plaintiff's
because defendant had job related skills while plaintiff did not;
that defendant and his environment would provide a better social
climate for the minor child.

(R.A. 81, para. 15- 20).
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The trial court also found that the custody evaluator
recommended that defendant be granted custody of the minor child
Drew Merriam. (R.A. 81, para- 21), Also, the court found that the
defendant is a patient father and reflects his love and concern for
the children in his activities with them and in tending them; that
plaintiff has engaged in extra-marital sexual relationships; that
plaintiff had not been honest with the court, and that the parties
both provided the primary care for the minor children.

(R.A.

82,

para. 23-26 . )
Obviously, the trial court relied upon more than plaintiff's extra-marital sexual relations in arriving at its custody
award in favor of defendant.
B. THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FROM WHICH THE TRIAL
COURT

COULD

PROPERLY

FIND

THAT

DEFENDANT'S

MORAL CONDUCT

WAS

SUPERIOR TO THAT OF PLAINTIFF.
Plaintiff asserts that the trial court erroneously found
that

defendant's

moral

conduct

was

superior

to

plaintiff's.

Apparently, plaintiff believes that because she denied any sexual
impropriety during her marriage to the defendant, the trial court
could not find against her on that issue.
Defendant testified that plaintiff admitted having extramarital sexual relations with other men during her marriage to
defendant and when questioned, stated she did it because other men
were exciting.

(T.T. 59, Ins. 1-8)

To overthrow the trial court's

findings, plaintiff must marshall the evidence in support of the
finding and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial
11

court's findings are so lacking in support as to be against the
clear weight of evidence and therefore, clearly erroneous.

The

Utah Supreme Court has held

the

that when an appellant claims

evidence is insufficient to support the trial court's findings of
fact, the Court will not weigh the evidence de novo and that great
deference will be granted the trial court's findings especially
when they are based on an evaluation of live conflicting testimony.
In The Matter of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, (Utah, 3/28/89) The decision in Bartell is consistent with Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

(Addendum, Exhibit A) .

Plaintiff has not shown that

the trial court's finding on the issue of the parties'

comparative

moral conduct is clearly erroneous.
C.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERROR IN CONSIDERING THE

TESTIMONY OF RUSSELL MEACHAM.
Plaintiff asserts that the trial court erroneously based
its finding of plaintiff's extra marital sexual relations on the
testimony of Russell Meacham and on the inference that the trial
court drew from Mr. Meacham's claim of privilege against
incrimination.

self

Plaintiff does not cite the portion of the record

or transcript of trial she relies upon to support this proposition.
As the record indicates, defendant testified that plaintiff admitted to having had sexual relationships with two other men during
the marriage and even provided defendant with the names of those
men.
There is nothing in the record to support plaintiff's
claim

that

the trial

court

relied
12

solely on

the testimony

of

Russell Meacham to arrive at its finding that plaintiff had extramarital sexual relations with other men during her marriage to
defendant.

Furthermore, there was ample independent evidence of

plaintiff's promiscuity during her marriage to defendant and of
plaintiff's relationship

with Mr. Meacham

that

the trial court

could properly infer that his answer would have been in the affirmative had he elected to answer the question posed by defendant.
Even if the trial court had erred in considering Mr.
Meacham's testimony or had improperly inferred that but for the
claim of privilege against self-incrimination, Mr. Meacham would
have admitted to sexual relations with plaintiff, the err was not
prejudicial to justify reversal of the judgment.

In Slusher v.

Ospital, 777 P.2d 437, (Utah, 1989), the Utah Supreme Court held
that harmless error does not justify reversal.

There was suffi-

cient other evidence in this case upon which the trial court could
find that plaintiff engaged in extra-marital sexual activities.
Thus, the trial court's consideration of Mr. Meacham's testimony
would not have been prejudicial error to warrant reversal of the
trial court's judgment.

(See also, Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure, Addendum, Exhibit B ) .
D.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT RELY SOLELY ON PLAINTIFF'S

EXTRA-MARITAL SEXUAL ACTIVITIES IN ARRIVING AT ITS CUSTODY DETERMINATION.
Plaintiff ignores other factors considered by the trial
court in arriving at its custody award.

Plaintiff persists in her

claim that the only basis for the trial court's award of custody
13

of the parties' child to defendant was the trial court's reliance
solely on the issue of plaintiff's extra-marital sexual activities.
The other factors relied upon by the tria] court have been previously outlined in subheading A in defendant's brief and defendant
will not restate those factors here.
E.

PLAINTIFF ERRONEOUSLY ASSERTS THAT THE TRIAL COURT

AWARDED CUSTODY OF THE MINOR CHILD TO THE DEFENDANT AS A MEANS OF
PUNISHING PLAINTIFF UNDER THE "OUTMODED CONCEPT OF FAULT."
In support of this unsupported assertion, plaintiff cites
Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199, (Utah App. 1987) and Davis v.
Davis, 749 P.2d 647, (Utah 1988).
The facts in Marchant are clearly distinguishable from
the facts m

this case.

The decision in Davis is inapplicable to

support plaintiff's claim that the custody award was based on the
outmoded concept of fault to punish plaint]ff.

Neither the facts

in this case or the cases cited by plaintiff support plaintiff's
claim that she was deprived of custody of the minor child Drew
Merriam as punishment for fault.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONSIDERING THE CUSTODY EVALUATION REPORT BECAUSE
PLAINTIFF INTRODUCED TESTIMONY ON THE
EVALUATION REPORT.

The custody evaluation was requested by plaintiff and
defendant stipulated to the evaluation.
During the D i a l , counsel for plaintiff elicited plaintiff's testimony regarding the evaluation process and report (T.T.
34, Ins. 13-25, p. 35, Ins. 1-25, p. 36, Ins. 1-14.)

14

Counsel for

the plaintiff also cross-examined defendant on the contents of the
evaluation report. (T.T. 77, Ins, 12-18)
Plaintiff now contends that the trial court should not
have considered the contents of the evaluation

report.

Since

plaintiff was solely responsible for introducing the evidence on
the evaluation report, she should not now be permitted to complain
that the trial court should not have considered the report.
Plaintiff further contends that the trial court should
have awarded custody of Drew Merriam to the plaintiff as a matter
of law. However, the evaluator found that the children have bonded
equally to the parties, each party demonstrated adequate parenting
skills and the children demonstrate affection, trust, and respect
for both parents.
the evaluator

Still, after considering all pertinent factors,

recommends defendant

be awarded custody of Drew

Merriam because defendant has a stronger social support system,
defendant's

financial

circumstances

are

better,

the

children

respond to defendant's instructions better, and defendant appears
more mature in long range planning and goal setting.
Exhibit C ) .

(Addendum,

Admittedly, all recommendations contained in a custody

evaluation report are "more judgmental than pure fact."

However,

even that concession does not support plaintiff's claim that the
custody of Drew Merriam should be awarded to her as a matter of
law.

Plaintiff cites Paryzek v. Paryzek, 776 P.2d 78 (Utah App.

1989), to support her contention that she should have been awarded
custody of Drew Merriam as a matter of law.
support that proposition.

Paryzek does not

Instead, the court in Paryzek remanded
15

the case to the District Court for further findings to factor in
the evidence in favor of
parties' minor sonity

in prior

the father

as to the custody

of the

The Court of Appeals acknowledged that stabil-

custodial

arrangements is an important factor

in

determining custody.
In this case, although plaintiff was granted temporary
custody pending trial by stipulation of the defendant, it was only
with the provision that defendant have visitation every weekend.
The evidence reflects that plaintiff resided with her
parents pending trial for all but the last four (4) weeks when she
moved into an apartment.

(T.T. 53, Ins. 1-18).

Since plaintiff

and her mother began work at 6:00 A.M., (T.T. 36, Ins. 21-25, P.
37, Ins. 1-5) plaintiff had a friend tend the children while she
was at work.

(T.T. 20, Ins. 12-14).

If her friend was not avail-

able, plaintiff's grandmother, who was in her late 70's, was the
alternate care provider.

(T.T. 20, Ins. 15-20, T.T. 99, Ins. 1-

4) .
On the other hand, defendant was residing in the home the
parties purchased during their marriage and where the minor child
lived since his birth.

(T.T. 9, Ins. 13-25, p. 10, Ins. 1-9)

When

defendant was at work, defendant intended to utilize an established
day care center or his parents to tend the minor child.

Under

these circumstances, defendants has as much, if not more, in his
favor on the issue of stability as does plaintiff.
The evaluator

recommended

custody of

Drew Merriam

be

awarded to defendant because he believed the evidence favored the
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defendant.

The trial court had the discretion to accept or reject

that recommendation.
III. THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FROM WHICH
THE COURT COULD FIND THAT BOTH PARTIES
RENDERED PRIMARY CARE.
Both parties testified that they rendered primary care
to the children during the marriage.

In stating that neither party

was the primary caretaker of the minor child Drew, the trial court
simply

stated

equally.

it believed

both

parties

rendered

primary

care

(R.A. 82, para. 26).
Plaintiff argues that because she had physical custody

of the minor child during the pretrial duration, she should, ipso
facto, be deemed to have rendered most of the primary care during
that time.

However, plaintiff began her work shift at 6:00 A.M.

each morning.

Thus the minor child was awakened at 5:00 A.M. in

the morning to be taken to the baby-sitter.

Defendant had the

minor child every weekend and rendered the primary care during each
weekend.

Under these circumstances, the trial court had adequate

justification to find that primary care for the minor child was
rendered equally by the parties.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN SPLITTING
CUSTODY OF THE MINOR CHILDREN.

Given the facts of this case, the trial court did not err
in granting custody of Drew Merriam to defendant while plaintiff
retained custody of Carson Draper.
As the record indicates, defendant would have liked to
obtain custody of both Carson Draper and Drew Merriam if the facts
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and the law would have permitted him to do so. (T.T. 11, Ins. 2125, p. 12, Ins.

1-9)

In Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117, (Utah, 1986), the trial
court ignored the recommendations of a social worker and plaintiff's brother who was a professional counselor and awarded custody
of one child to each of the parties. The Utah Supreme Court upheld
the split custody award.

The Court stated:

"...The court did not follow the recommendations made by the social worker or the
plaintiff's brother. As child custody determination turns on numerous factors, however,
that choice was within it's discretion."
Similarly, in Alexander v. Alexander, 737 P.2d 221, (Utah
1987), the Utah Supreme Court upheld a trial court decree which
awarded three older children to the plaintiff father while awarding
custody of the youngest child to defendant mother.

Justice Durham,

speaking for the court stated:
"We decline to overturn the trial court.
Where there is evidence to support a ruling,
the task of determining the best interests of
the child in a custody dispute is for the trial
judge, who has the opportunity to personally
observe and evaluate the witnesses. If a trial
judge exercises his discretion in accord with
the standards set by this Court, the decision
will not be overturned."
In this case, it is obvious that the trial court clearly
recognized that the moral, social, physical and financial environment which defendant could provide greatly outweighed the benefit
of keeping the siblings together.
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CONCLUSION
Defendant respectfully submits that the trial court did
not err in awarding custody of the minor child, Drew Merriam, to
the defendant and the trial court's decree should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

Kenneth M. Hisatake
Attorney for Respondent
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EXHIBIT A

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 52

Rule 52. Findings by the court.
(a) Effect In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule
58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the
grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of
review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence,
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.
The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be
considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of
decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 4Kb). The
court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its
decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59
when the motion is based on more than one ground.
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after
entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional findings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with
a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made
in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of
the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not
the party raising the question has made in the district court an objection to
such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for judgment, or a motion for a new trial.
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions
for divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the
parties to, an issue of fact:
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial;
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause;
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes.
(Amended, effective Jan. 1, 1987.)
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amendmerit, in Subdivision (a), deleted "and" preceding"in granting" in the first sentence, inserted
the third and fifth sentences, rewrote the sixth
sentence and added the last sentence.

Compiler's Notes, — This rule is similar to
Rule 52, F.R.C.P.
Cross-References. — Masters, Rule 53.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Adoption.
—Abandonment of contract.
—Advisory verdict.
—Breach of contract
—Child custody.
—Contempt.
—Credibility of witnesses.

—Denial of motion.
—Divorce decree modifications.
—Easement.
—Evidentiary disputes.
--Juvenile action.
—Material issues.
Harmless error.
—Submission by prevailing party.
Court's discretion.
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EXHIBIT B

Rule 61

UTAH RULLS OP CIVIL PROCEDURE

record Bowen v Olson, 122 Utah 66, 246 P 2d
602 (1952)
Where the affidavit for publication of sum
mons presented no evidentiary facts, a default
judgment entered against the defendant can be
attacked collaterally Bowen v Olson, 122
Utah 66, 246 P 2d 602 (1952)
Unauthorized appearance,
Wife who had been personally served with
process but had no actual knowledge of action
was not entitled to relief from judgment
against her and her husband on ground that
appearance for her by attorney retained by
husband was without her authority Plaintiff
would have been entitled to default judgment
against wife, and his position could not be
worsened by unauthorized appearance over
which he had no control Brimhall v Mecham,
27 Utah 2d 222, 494 P 2d 525 (1972)
Cited in Goddard v Bundy, 121 Utah 299,
241 P 2d 462 (1952), Board of Educ v Cox, 16
Utah 2d 20, 395 P 2d 55 (1964), Parker v

Rolfson, 525 P 2d 612 (Utah 1974), Dynapac,
Inc v Innovations, Ine, 550 P 2d 191 (Utah
1976), Olsen v Cummings, 565 P 2d 1123
(Utah 1977), Pitts v Pine Meadow Ranch, Inc ,
589 P2d 767 (Utah 1978), Peay v Peay, 607
P2d 841 (Utah 1980), Miller Pontiac, Ine v
Osborne, 622 P 2d 800 (Utah 1981), Kohler v
Garden City, 639 P 2d 162 (Utah 1981), St
Pierre v Edmonds, 645 P 2d 615 (Utah 1982),
Kanzee v Karuee, 668 P 2d 495 (Utah 1983),
Pease v Industrial Comm'n, 694 P 2d 613
(Utah 1984), Wiese v Wiese, 699 P 2d 700
(Utah 1985), In re Estate of Chasel, 725 P 2d
1345 (Utah 1986), Katz v Pierce, 732 P 2d 92
(Utah 1986), Myers v Garff, 655 F Supp 1021
(D Utah 1987), Wood v Weenig,736 P 2d 1053
(Utah 1987), Fackrell v Fackrell, 710 P 2d
1318 (Utah 1987), Tripp v Vaughn, 7J7 P 2d
1051 (Utah Ct App 1987), Blodgett v Zions
First Nafl Bank, 752 P 2d 901 (Utah Ct App
1988), Ramon ex rel Ramon v Farr, 101 Utah
Adv Rep 48 (1989)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am, Jur, 2d — 46 Am Jur 2d Judgments of Federal Rules of Civil procedure authorizing
§§ 200, 671 et seq
ichef fiorn final judgment where its prospecC J S. — 49 C J S Judgment* ^ 228 et seq , tive application is inequitable, 11 ALR Fed
237
309
A.L R — Incompetence of counsel as giound
Independent actions to obtain relief from
for relief from state court civil judgment, 64 judgment, order, or proceeding under Rule
A L R 4 t h 323
60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Relief from judicial error by motion under 53 A L R Fed 558
F R C P Rule 60(b)(1), 1 A L R Ted 771
Lack of jurisdiction, or jurisdictional eiror,
Propriety of conditions imposed in granting
rehef from judgment under Rule of Civil Proce- as rendering federal district court judgment
"void" for purposes of relief under Rule 60(b)(4)
dure 60(b), 3 A L R Fed 956
Construction of Rule 60(a) of Federal Rules of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 59 A L R
of Civil Procedure authorizing correction of Fed 831
Effect of filing of notice of appeal on motion
clerical mistakes and judgments, orders or
other parts of the records and errors therein to vacate judgment under Rule 60(b) of Federal
arising from oversight or omission, 13 A L R Rules of Civil Procedure, 62 A L R l\d 148
Key Numbers — Judgment <*=> 291 et seq ,
Fed 794
Construction and application of Rule 60(b)(5) 306, 307

Rule 61. Harmless error.
No error in either the admission oi the exclusion of evidence, and no en or
or defect in any ruling or oider or m anything done oi omitted by the couit or
by any of the parties, is ground for gi anting a new trial or otherwise distuibing a judgment or order, unless lefusal to take such action appeals to the
court inconsistent with substantial justice The couit at every stage of the
proceeding must disiegaid any enoi oi defect in the pioceeding which does
not affect the substantial rights of the parties
Compiler's Notes — 'Ihis rule is similar to
Rule 61, F R C P
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EXHIBIT C
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TODD MERRIAM, DEFENDANT
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JUDGE DON V. TIBBS, PRESIDING

ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF:

BRENT BARTHOLOMEW
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KENNETH M. HISATAKE

CUSTODY EVALUATOR:

UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES
OFFICE OF COMMUNITY OPERATIONS
JOHN N. BAGLEY, LCSW

Date Submitted:

June 12, 1989

RAYCHELLE MERRIAM
Raychelle Merriam was born May 22, 1966. Both, of Raychelle's parents
are alive and currently living in Manti, Utah. Rachelle is the fifth
child of a family of six having two older brothers and sisters and one
younger brother. She reported that her life as a child was normal and
happy and that she enjoyed very close relationships with all of the
family. Raychelle lived with her parents until her sophomore year in
high school when she moved to Delta, Utah and lived with her sister.
While attending school in Delta she met Kim Draper and married him on
June 3, 1983. After their marriage Kim and Raychelle moved to Denver,
Colorado, where Kim had secured employment at a horse race track. She
stated that the marriage was extremely difficult. By August of 1983 they
returned to Delta, Utah. Raychelle stated that both she and her husband,
Kim, were too young and immature to deal with the responsibilities of
married life on their own. Raychelle's first son, Carson, was born in
Delta on December 18, 1983. The following March Raychelle and Kim
separated and Raychelle moved herself and her son to Mt. Pleasant, Utah.
Her divorce to Kim was final in August of 198'*.
Raychelle related that she had been acquainted with her current
husband, Todd Merriam, while she was in high school. After her divorce
from Kim, Raychelle returned to school and graduated with her class by
completing her courses via home study. Raychelle stated that Todd was
out of school when she met him, and that he was viewed as a "prize catch"
due to his popularity in the community.
Raychelle and Todd were married November 22, 1985. Since Todd was
living in Salt Lake City at the time they relocated to Midvale, Utah,
upon their marriage. Raychelle recounted their time while in Midvale as
being fairly stable and normal. She was pregnant at the time and stated
Todd had a very difficult time accepting her body changes due to the
pregnancy. She also felt extremely isolated and did not have friends or
family in the ares. In July of 1986, Todd and Raychelle moved back to
Manti, Utah, after the birth of their son, Drew on June 3, 1986.
Raychelle stated that after the move back to Manti their relationship
became even more distant and less satisfying. She stated that Todd was
never at home and spent most of his time with friends. She said this was
difficult for her since his friends were single people who liked to
party, drink, smoke, etc., and she was not included or invited.
Raychelle recalled that as time progressed Todd became more violent, used
alcohol more, and his threats became more frequent. On one occasion,
Raychelle said Todd threatened to kill her; and on another, threatened to
kill himself.
Raychelle stated that Todd was extremely jealous of her first husband
and would not allow her to accept child support from him. She related
that his insecurity and jealousy were a constant problem in their
marriage. Raychelle's work history was one of accommodation, she felt,
to keep the peace at home. She stated that Todd made her stop working
several jobs because he was jealous of her working directly with the
public. Raychelle is currently working at a Picadilly Plant packaging
fish products for distrubution. She works four days per week from 6:00
a.m. to 4:00 p.m.. Raychelle and her two sons are living with her
parents in Manti, Utah.
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BACKGROUND INFORMATION
TODD MERRIAM
Todd Merriam was born February 5, 1961, in Mt. Pleasant, Utah.
Todd's parents are both alive and living in Manti, Utah. He was the
third child with one older sister and brother. Todd related his
childhood and youth as extremely happy with close reltionships between
him and his parents. Todd stated that he was raised by his father to
accept responsibility and respect other people at a very early age. He
did not recall any events that were traumatic for him.
The dates and basic historical narrative for Todd are the same as
Raychelle's for the period they were married and living together. Prior
to Todd's marriage to Raychelle, he did have one short-lived marriage.
After his graduation in 1980 from high school, Todd worked for Manti City
on a utility prower crew for one and one half years. Then he met and
married Leslie Swan from Aurora, Utah, and moved to the Salt Lake City
area. This marriage lasted two years between 1983 and 1985 and no
children were born to the couple.
As recorded earlier, Todd and Raychelle formed their union on
November 22, 1985. Todd has many similar memories of his life with
Rqychelle, but also many different perceptions of the reasons their
marriage did not remain intact. According to Todd, their marriage was a
good relationship while they lived in Salt Lake City. The first major
conflict was when Raychelle decided to become pregnant without his
consent or knowledge. Todd stated that, in retrospect, he did spend too
much time with his friends at the beginning of their marriage. However,
after Raychelle became pregnant he stated he spent more time with her,
and that this damaged their relationship also, due to her constant
demanding behavior and general irritability.
Todd and Raychelle returned to Manti in July of 1986. Todd's memory
of this time is similar to Rachelle's in that both indicated that their
relationship was not satisfactory and that their marriage was close to
its end. However, Todd remembered his behavior during this time in a
much different way than Raychelle. Todd stated that he was extremely
frustrated with Raychelle due to her seductive behavior with other men.
Todd further stated that he was aware of at least one extra-marital
affair during this time period, and several after their separation when
Raychelle moved into an apartment of her own.
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CARSON
DREW

D.O.B.J
D.O.B.:

12-18-83
06/03/86

(Prior Marriage)
(Current Marriage)

Both Carson and Drew were interviewed and observed on two occasions.
The first session was with Raychelle, the second with Todd. The children
were observed in interaction with each parent, and while involved in
independent play activity. Carson and Drew are active, articulate and
physically handsome children who appear normal for their chronological
age.
Carson, age 5, was extremely easy to talk with and was eager to
listen to the conversation and offer his opinion for the first 10
minutes, and was then distracted. His brother, Drew, age 3, was far more
interested in play and did not participate in the conversation without
being asked a direct question.
Both of the children displayed appropriate affection to Raychelle and
Todd, and neither showed any signs of fear or hesitancy with them.
During the course of the interviews it was obvious that the children had
formed bonds with both Raychelle and Todd. The childrens' response to
verbal direction was very different, however, with each parent. Carson
and Drew both ignored verbal instruction when given by Raychelle and
continued with their activities in spite of her warnings. On the other
hand, both children responded to Todd's verbal instruction without
complaint and redirected their activities as requested.
When asked simple questions about their feelings, and how they
perceived the present situation, both children indicated that they loved
both parents. Neither Carson or Drew showed a clear preference to either
parent. The only response that was special came from Carson when
Raychelle was discussing Todd's violent behavior on one occasion. As
Raychelle was describing this incident Carson acted out a simulated
violent confrontation with a cushion on the couch. He said he was
showing me how men could be tough and hurt people. Raychelle stated that
Carson had witnessed a fight she and Todd had at their home in Manti.
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A.

The child's preference

Neither child expressed a strong preference and seemed to be
equally at ease with both parents.
B.

Benefit of keeping siblings together

There appears to be a significant bond between Carson and Drew.
The two children were observed in play together and demonstrated a
friendly, cooperative manner towards one another. This is a factor
that needs consideration.
C.

The child's bond with one or both of the prospective custodians

While both children demonstrated affection towards each parent,
there was not a clear differential in the strength of the bonding.
It may be important to note that Carson has experienced a bonding
disruption in his infancy already; and this can have a pronounced
effect on his ability to adjust to future, and similar, disruptions.
This will be discussed further in the summary.
D. The general interest in continuing previously determined custody
arrangements
Both Carson and Drew are being adequately cared for in their
present situation. The joint visitation does not appear to be
harmful to either child. However, the question of permanency is not
resolved as the situation now exists.
E-l.

Moral character and emotional stability

This issue is an area that may have importance in the overall
decision. During the evaluation process Todd stated numerous times
that the extramarital sexual behavior of Raychelle was an important
factor in their marriage problems and contributed to his violent
behavior. Todd also feels this should be a factor in the final
decision of custody, Raychelle, on the other hand, contends that
Todd is prone to violence, use and abuse of alcohol, and has in the
past demonstrated emotional instability.
E-2,

Duration and depth of desire for custody

Both Todd and Raychelle expressed a strong desire to have
custody of the children. It is interesting to note that Todd only
wants primary custody of the youngest child, Drew. He explained this
by stating that since he was not the natural father of Carson, and he
did not adopt him, he didn't feel he had a legitimate claim towards
custody. However, he was very aware of the bond Carson and Drew have
and would support this by asking for visitation with Carson.
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E~3. Significant impairment of ability to function as a parent
through drug abuse, excessive drinking or other causes.
At the present time neither parent is impaired and both seem to
have a healthy lifestyle.
E~4.

Reasons for having relinquished custody in the past.
Not applicable

E-5.

Religious compatibility with the child
This is not an issue for either parent.

E-6.

Kinship

This is an issue for Todd. As mentioned earlier he is
requesting custody of Drew only, with visitation right for Carson.
Raychelle, being the natural mother of both children, is requesting
custody of both Carson and Drew, During the interviews with the
children it was noted that both children referred to Todd as dad.
E-7.

Financial condition

Both Rachelle and Todd are employed. Todd is currently capable
of supporting himself and children without assistance. Raychellefs
employment is marginal; however, she does have plans to return to
school and receive training as a dental technician. Raychelle's
gross income per week is slightly less than $200.00 and she receives
day care through the state. Todd's income is variable, but he
reported a take-home pay of $450.00 to $500.00 every two weeks.
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Both Raychelle and Todd were extremely helpful and cooperative in
this evaluation process. It is unfortunate that this marriage was not
satisfactory to either party and that the children will suffer the trauma
of separation from one parent.
In reviewing the information collected, there are few points that are
usable to make a decision for or against either Raychelle or Todd. The
children have bonded with both parents, and they demonstrate affection,
trust, and respect for both parents. Todd has a stable home and reliable
employment. Raychelle also has a regular job, plans to upgrade her
employment skills, and would [in time] create a stable home life as she
has done in the past. Both parents demonstrated adequate parent-child
skills during the interview process, although the children did respond
more favorably to Todd's direction.
The only factors that are of real concern deal with their emotional
maturity and their personal value systems. Since the information Todd
related about Raychelle's promiscuity is not verifiable by this
evaluator, it is difficult to make a judgement based on his word only.
The same can be said about Raychelle's claims of Todd's violence and
excessive drinking. Neither of these matters are documented, and law
enforcement records cannot substantiate any behavior of a criminal nature
by either party.
Both Raychelle and Todd have had prior marriages that also failed.
This will be Raychelle's second divorce, and Todd's second. Both parties
married rather young the first time, and their first marriages lasted
less than two years. In short, there is very little to base an objective
judgement on in this case.
Subjectively, this evaluator has formed some opinions regarding
Raychelle and Todd and their possible abilities to provide a strong,
stable, and healthy environment for young children.
One:

Todd has a much stronger social support system in the
Manti area then Raychelle.

Two:

Todd is financially more sound than Raychelle.

Three:

The children respond to Todd's instructions more readily
than to Raychelle.

Four:

Raychelle has the advantage of being female. The female
is the most desirable parent for bonding in ages 0-six,
according to current child development experts.

Five:

Todd appears more mature in his long-range planning and
goal setting.
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In closing, the recommendation of this evaluator is to grant
custody of Drew, age three, to Todd Merriam, with liberal visitation
rights. For reasons that are more judgmental than pure fact, this
evaluator feels Todd Merriajn will provide the necessary care, stability,
and structure for Drew to develop and mature into a responsible adult.
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